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A Problem of Social Capital and Cultural Norms? 
By Salaam Yitbarek* 
 
Abstract 
This paper asserts that in Ethiopian society, there exist certain cultural norms or 
‘dysfunctional behaviours’ that inhibit effective communication, lead to intra-group 
conflict, and make conflict resolution difficult. This has resulted in a diminished capacity 
for cooperation and a dearth of social capital and civil society, which does not bode well 
for development and democracy. It is imperative that research is expanded in the 
neglected area of cultural norms and social capital in Ethiopian society, and that 
intervention strategies are designed to increase social capital by addressing cultural 
norms directly through social marketing, awareness raising, and other mechanisms. 
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“If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop 
and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions spreads.” 
 
Alexis de Toqueville, 1988. Democracy in America. 
 
Introduction 
Much of this paper is based on my anecdotal observations of and experiences within 
Ethiopian collectives of various sorts, mostly in the diaspora, but also in Ethiopia. This is 
not a formal ethnographic study, but a discussion paper whose aim is to put forth a thesis, 
raise pertinent questions, and most important of all, encourage much-needed research and 
practical development work around the area of cultural norms and social capital in 
Ethiopian society. 
 
Over years of interacting with fellow Ethiopians in group settings, I have found that, in 
general, Ethiopian collectives tend to be ineffective, inefficient, and short-lived.1 Some 
mundane examples: Meetings, formal or informal, are invariably disorganized, 
unproductive, and never-ending. Group members are often late to meetings and 
appointments (but if the meeting or appointment involves a non-Ethiopian participant, 
they are careful to be on time). Communication is opaque and communications skills 
generally poor. Feuding and infighting are rampant. There is a constant and chronic 
manifestation of intra-group conflict—personal conflict among individuals or sub-groups 
within the collective—for which it is often difficult to find rational explanations. There is 
an absence of effective conflict resolution, and so these conflicts escalate and eventually 
reach a point of no return. Over time, the collective degenerates into a forum for personal 
conflict, begins losing its members as they feel increasingly alienated, and becomes 
incapable of fulfilling its mandate, with the final result being group paralysis and then 
collapse. 
 
This type of caricature of Ethiopian group dynamics is not uncommon among Ethiopians 
in the diaspora, mainly because we get to participate in and observe non-Ethiopian 
collectives, especially mainstream (North American or European) collectives, and make 
the inevitable comparisons.2 We find that most mainstream groups tend to work relatively 
well. Members are punctual and meetings functional. Communication is usually seamless 
and transparent. There is little avoidable conflict, and what conflict occurs is easily 
resolved with an evidently strong aptitude for conflict resolution. All in all, mainstream 
groups tend to be quite effective in fulfilling their mandates to the satisfaction of their 
individual members and the group as a whole. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Parts of this paper are based on the article, “Time to Declare War on Dysfunctional Behaviors,” that I had 
published under a pseudonym at http://www.ethiomedia.com/carepress/dysfunctional_behaviors.html. 
2
 Complaints about punctuality, pessimism about the effectiveness of groups, expressing reluctance to ‘get 
involved’ in collectives of any sort and similar sentiments can be heard in everyday conversations amongst 
Ethiopians. A lucid example is Weichegud’s (pseudonym) weblog entry, “A Tale of Two Meetings,” at 
http://weichegud.blogspot.com/2006/09/tale-of-two-meetings.html. 
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Given this experience, I, like many others, have asked myself why Ethiopian collectives 
are relatively weak and rife with conflict. Is this a problem only with certain types of 
collectives; say, political interest groups? In my experience, no. Chronic intra-group 
conflict occurs in all types of Ethiopian collectives—families, extended families, 
professional associations, churches, local community organizations, traditional 
associations, charity organizations, as well as political interest groups. Are these conflicts 
based on real and tangible reasons, such as differences in outlook or interests? No, I have 
observed virulent conflict within homogenous groups consisting of individuals with 
seemingly similar needs and wants, interests, perspectives, frames of reference, and 
ideologies. Most interesting of all, I have found little difference in the propensity and 
nature of conflicts that occur within collectives in Ethiopia and those in the Ethiopian 
diaspora. This despite the fact that Ethiopians in the diaspora have relatively higher levels 
of education than those in Ethiopia, live in relative prosperity, comfort, and freedom, and 
in their everyday lives get to experience the ample examples of effective collectives 
found in the mainstream community.3 
 
These observations have led me to believe that there are certain underlying cultural 
norms and behaviours in Ethiopian society that inhibit effective communication, lead to 
intra-group conflict, and hamper conflict resolution. I call these ‘dysfunctional 
behaviours’. These behaviours exist in all societies to some degree or another, but I 
believe their preponderance in Ethiopian society explains the relative weakness of 
Ethiopian collectives. In this paper, I describe these dysfunctional behaviours and their 
underlying norms, relating them to findings on Ethiopian society as expressed in 
mainstream academic literature. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of social 
capital in the context of this paper. I explain that these behaviours and norms make 
voluntary cooperation and group work difficult by retarding the development of the ‘art 
of association’, hence, stifling social capital. Finally, I suggest avenues for research and 
development work this area, and suggest that intervention strategies designed to increase 
social capital and civil society should include ways of addressing these cultural norms 
directly through social marketing, awareness-raising, and other intervention mechanisms. 
Dysfunctional Behaviours 
Most of the behaviours discussed below are identified on the basis of my lived 
experience. They are inter-related and interdependent, and have in common the property 
of inhibiting collaboration and cooperation, either through hampering effective 
communication, promoting conflict, or hindering conflict resolution. 
 
                                                 
3
 The education numbers are surprisingly high—according to the 2000 U.S. Census, 30% of Ethiopians in 
the U.S. have a bachelor’s degree or higher, and over 60% have some post-secondary education. 
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1. Personalization of issues 
This is the inability to conceptually distinguish between a person and their ideas 
or thoughts. Criticism of another’s position or ideas, or even endorsement that 
happens to be lukewarm or not enthusiastic enough, is perceived as a personal 
slight or attack instead of an objective assessment of the idea at hand. Often, to 
save face and honour, the ‘offended’ party must promptly respond in kind. This 
response occurs usually through the means of a veiled but well-understood insult. 
Again, for the sake of honour, this insult cannot go unanswered, and a destructive 
cycle of communication ensues, with what should have been a constructive 
discussion or debate quickly descending into personal conflict. Once a 
confrontation has begun, the participants are loath to retreat from their positions, 
as that would be seen as weakness by colleagues, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ alike. 
 
People seem especially prone to such behaviour in group settings. Being 
contradicted in front of others is especially damaging, embarrassing, and is seen 
as devaluing of one’s reputation. “How dare you disagree with me in everyone 
listening?” or “Why did you not support me in front of all those people?” is a 
common sentiment. Again, no difference is observed between people and ideas. 
 
Obviously, this leads to dysfunctional group dynamics. Group members become 
reluctant to discuss ideas openly and in clear terms, knowing that any positions 
taken are likely to result in confrontation with some parties or other. Ideas are not 
properly discussed and vetted, and much time is spent avoiding, heading off, or 
healing personal rifts. Communication deteriorates, severely handicapping the 
group, often to the point of making it useless, both objectively and from the point 
of view of the participants. 
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2. Parochialism 
There is a pronounced tendency to irrationally favour those from one’s own kin or 
‘side’ no matter what the cost. For example, continuing with the above theme, say 
that during a meeting, a disagreement occurs over a particular issue of debate and 
the disagreement devolves into personal conflict. When parochial instincts kick 
in, the participants in the meeting quickly begin to take sides in the conflict. They 
may choose to side with a friend, family member, relative, co-worker, neighbour, 
member of the same ethnic group, etc. The conflict is extended from personal to 
sub-group, following the same set of norms that foster traditional blood feuds 
(dem, in Amharic).  
 
What is most interesting is the ease with which these groups form. Damtew et al 
(2005) remark that “kin groups cooperate much more significantly in this respect 
(organizing for parochial confrontation) than in economic matters”. In the absence 
of obvious dividing lines—say, all participants are from the same family—
dividing lines will be sought and found!4 The instinct for confrontation and 
defence overcomes the very raison d’être of the greater group. The reason for the 
meeting, the topic of discussion, and the need to avoid or resolve conflict are all 
forgotten. 
 
As sub-group conflict is much more difficult to resolve than personal conflict, 
parochial instincts end up causing enormous damage to collectives. Once rival 
sub-groups begin to form and solidify, the very existence of the collective is 
threatened.  
  
                                                 
4
 “This parochialism is manifest in diverse ways in the different social strata,” writes Levine (1965). 
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3. Mutual suspicion and mutual distrust 
While observing or participating in meetings or any other occasion for group 
dialogue, I have noticed that far too often, even the most innocuous and harmless 
remarks are interpreted as insults or personal attacks. For example, during a board 
meeting, a director-at-large makes a statement about having to tighten finances, 
and various participants around the room automatically assume he is pointing his 
finger at them. One of them makes a sharp retort, perhaps with some veiled 
remarks intended to personally attack the initial speaker. A personal conflict 
begins to brew. For the detached observer, the situation can be confusing. What 
brought about the conflict? The first speaker was not addressing anyone in 
particular, so why did the second react in a hostile manner? And why does 
everyone else seem not so confused? 
 
Such episodes seem the result of Ethiopians’ tendency to view each other first and 
foremost as potential threats. With such a heightened level of suspicion and 
threat-awareness, any expressed idea or thought, no matter how innocuous, is 
considered to have ulterior motives behind it. As such, even the most innocent 
comments by the closest of friends can be misinterpreted as intentionally 
offensive, resulting in the breakup of previously fruitful relationships. 
 
Interestingly, the Amharic language contains many proverbs reflecting suspicion 
and distrust, e.g. YalTereTere YemeneTeral (“He who is not vigilantly suspicious 
will be displaced from this land”), Amno Qebro new (“Trust only the dead and 
buried”), and Sew meTTa neger yemeTal (Namni dufu dubbin dufa in Afan 
Oromo, “A man has come; a quarrel will come”).5 These proverbs serve to 
indicate the prevalence of mutual suspicion in Ethiopian society. 
 
Needless to say, general distrust weakens collectives. In my experience, it makes 
group work so difficult and tedious that members end up devaluing their 
collective and eventually withdrawing participation. 
 
                                                 
5
 The last proverb and Afan Oromo translation is from Cerulli (1923). 
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4. Paranoia 
Here, what is meant by paranoia is mutual suspicion and distrust taken to the 
extreme. As everyone is viewed as a threat, individuals tend to develop a 
disproportionately paranoid outlook in their interactions with others. With the 
‘threat’ foremost in mind, sinister plots are imagined to be all around and a 
‘conspiracy theory’ mindset is cultivated. 
 
“Yalsema joro ke gorebet gar yTalal (He who does not pay attention and listen 
fights with his neighbour),” goes the Amharic saying, one interpretation being: A 
person who does not pay careful attention to the talk around him ends up 
assuming that it is malicious gossip about him, and goes to his neighbour to 
retaliate. It is the assumption part that is most interesting; that is, how the person 
errs on the side of assuming conspiracy. 
 
A significant side effect of paranoia is that it hinders self-reflection. One’s own 
contribution to a given state of affairs and one’s responsibility and ability to 
change it is ignored.
6
 All focus is on external parties that are considered the sole 
causes of the problem. 
 
5. Lack of empathy and empathetic understanding 
In my experience, a large part of the deficit in listening and communications skills 
in Ethiopian collectives is due to the absence of empathy and empathetic 
understanding. Rarely have I found people in the course of dialogue considering 
questions such as “what is causing him to behave this way”, “how might his 
background or perspective be influencing his thoughts”, or “what would I have 
done were I in his place”. Even rarer is the practice of ‘suspending judgement’ or 
giving others the benefit of the doubt (whether consciously or sub-consciously). 
 
Instead, judgements are made hastily and with incomplete information, with the 
‘judge’ not having taken the time to try to empathize with the speaker or consider 
all the variables in play. This not only leads to ‘communication gaps’ or 
misunderstandings, but inevitably leads to conflict, especially when combined 
with tendencies toward mutual suspicion and distrust. 
 
                                                 
6
 This is a partial reflection of the ‘renowned Ethiopian fatalism’ discussed in Messay (1999), starting at p. 
173. 
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6. Character assassination 
Rather than addressing conflict or even potential conflict directly, I have found in 
Ethiopian collectives a tendency for members to chronically spread rumours 
(often fantastic) and innuendo about those with whom they disagree or perceive 
themselves to be in conflict. 
 
Interestingly, character assassination turns out to be an effective weapon against 
one’s perceived enemies. Mutual suspicion and a lack of empathetic 
understanding means that people tend not to give each other the benefit of the 
doubt, but rather believe the worst about each other! With people already 
suspicious of each other, a defamation campaign simply ends up confirming 
existing suspicions. 
 
In my experience, there is a strong awareness of how lethal character 
assassination is, and so people in conflict, or in anticipation of conflict, begin low-
level defamation campaigns as a defence mechanism. The conflict intensifies and 
turns into a character assassination war, which, of course, greatly reduces the 
chances that any sort of resolution will take place. 
 
When such a conflict occurs in a collective, it is often cancerous. Reputations 
being at stake, the conflict is bound to escalate and absorb other participants, 
putting the collective at grave risk. This is an often seen pattern in Ethiopian 
collectives. 
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7. Lack of openness 
Rarely does one observe open and frank communication amongst Ethiopians. As 
Levine (1965, p. 251) writes, the idea is to “Avoid binding commitments; 
maximize the degrees of freedom left after any utterance.” In general, there is an 
extreme reluctance to be open and forthcoming, and an expectation of the same 
guarded approach from others. Indeed, frank expression of one’s thoughts is often 
derided as somewhat backward, childish, naïve, or even dangerously indiscreet. 
Dangerous not only to the speaker, but also to the group to which he belongs. It is 
almost as though if the group’s ‘secrets’ are let out, it will be exposed to dangers 
from without, dangers that a chronically suspicious mindset imagines to be clear 
and present. 
 
The general lack of empathy, by making people afraid of being judged hastily and 
incorrectly if they speak openly and unambiguously, contributes to the hesitation 
to be open. This fear leads people to be initially vague, unclear, and non-
committal, which inevitably leads to communication gaps and breakdowns as 
others engage in the complicated and error-prone exercise of trying to interpret 
the hidden meaning of what was said. Again, because of the suspicious mindset, 
the interpretation often turns out to be negative. 
 
The unholy trinity of mutual suspicion, lack of empathy, and lack of openness 
renders effective communication very difficult. People are afraid of being 
incorrectly judged, speak ambiguously, their statements are interpreted 
negatively, and this in turn legitimizes their initial fear, and so on. 
  
8. Holding grudges 
Even after declaring forgiveness for some perceived slight, people continue to 
steadfastly hold on to personal grudges and hope and plot for vengeance. How 
often I have heard people say something like, “I forgive her, but I don’t want to 
see her (face) again.” It seems that though forgiveness is a norm to be aspired to, 
it is in practice too difficult to attain.7 
 
Understanding or forgiveness of perceived affronts is seen as a loss of honour and 
a sign of weakness. In a group context, I have often witnessed an extreme 
reluctance both to apologize for and to forgive even the smallest incident. This, of 
course, makes group interaction difficult; mistakes and conflict are bound to arise, 
and holding on to grudges makes them hard to resolve. 
 
                                                 
7
 Levine (1965, pp. 81-83) has more on what I call the conflict between what ‘should be done’ and ‘what is 
done’ in Ethiopia. That is, the extent to which a society adheres to its own formally established norms. 
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9. Envy 
The proverbial totem pole seems to be all-important in Ethiopian society. Relative 
rank is much more important than absolute. People destroy others’ property or 
reputations, or even each other, with nothing to gain for themselves personally, 
except the consolation that they are now relatively better off than their victim. 
 
I was once privy to a conversation between an old and wise widower monk and a 
novice monk, in which the latter was explaining that the bout of ill health he was 
recovering from was caused by an evil spell. The story was that some time before, 
a visiting priest asked all the monks for their names so that he could pray for them 
in his daily prayers. Some gave him their names, he wrote them down, and the 
next day, left the monastery. Shortly thereafter, this novice monk fell ill, and he 
suspected that the priest had used the paper he had written the monks’ names on 
the cast an evil spell. The wise monk was sympathetic but firmly admonished the 
novice. “How could you give him your name?” he asked, “One should only ever 
divulge one’s baptismal name!” (A spell cannot be cast using a baptismal name.) 
Note that both monks consider it is perfectly normal for people to do harm to 
others out of the blue and with no benefit to themselves; in fact, while putting 
themselves at risk. And note the advice of the senior monk: to be always vigilant 
and chronically suspicious. 
 
Such envy is an outgrowth of an ingrained perception that everything in life is a 
zero-sum game.8 If someone is rich, it is because another is poor. If someone is 
happy, it is because another is sad. It is as if the world has been alloted a fixed 
amount of wealth, happiness, etc., and it has been ordained that everyone should 
have more or less the same amount. Failing this, the ones with more must have 
committed some kind of crime or evil act to improve their lot, and the ones who 
have less must be cursed.9 These attitudes are reflected in the Amharic saying: Ke 
guadegnochua yebeleTech mashela le wef temechalech (“A millet stalk grown 
taller than its ‘colleagues’ attracts the birds”). 
 
Envy complicates social relationships and therefore group dynamics. As the 
example above illustrates, it goes hand in hand with mutual suspicion, making it 
difficult to develop a culture of cooperation.  
 
                                                 
8
 Foster (1965), in his famous paper, writes that the ‘image of the limited good’ or zero-sum perception is 
characteristic of many peasant societies. 
9
 Platteau (2001, p. 4) and elsewhere talks about ‘egalitarian’ or ‘other-regarding’ norms in societies where 
resources are or have traditionally been perceived as being scarce. Those who succeed outside of the norm, 
such as the classic ‘dynamic farmer’, are sometimes forced into self-exile as they cannot stand the 
downward pressure on them. These exiles form the ‘immigrant entrepreneur’ class in their new homes. 
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10. Stubbornness and lack of compromise 
The zero-sum view of the world leads many to view compromise as weakness. In 
the context of a win-loss game, compromise is a loss. Anyone who makes the 
slightest move towards negotiation or concession is perceived by adversaries and 
onlookers as weak. The response to conciliatory gestures then, instead of being 
reciprocally conciliatory, is retrenchment, in order to take advantage of the 
perceived weakness. A win-win scenario, with compromise as a building block 
for establishing solid relationships that will be mutually beneficial in the future, is 
scarcely envisioned. 
 
Such thinking is anathema to the very basis of conflict resolution, which is the art 
of finding win-win situations. 
 
Before proceeding further, a note of clarification; some may claim that many of the 
norms and behaviours are properly attributed to particular segments of Ethiopian society, 
notably the ‘Abyssinians’ (normally the Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups or 
nationalities), given the analysis in much of the literature (Levine 1965, Levine 2000 
[1974], Korten 1971, Crummey 1980, and others). Many of the above norms and 
behaviours are partially associated with the ‘hierarchical-individualistic with weak 
horizontal ties’ properties commonly attributed to Amhara and Tigray society. Whereas 
the Oromo, for example, are commonly characterised as communal (as opposed to 
individualistic), practicing ‘egalitarian collectivism’, and having somewhat different 
cultural norms in this regard (Levine, 2000 [1974]). 
 
Though inter-ethnic differences are certainly relevant, there are two points to be made in 
this regard. First, it is probably safe to say that what is called Amhara/Tigray culture 
forms a significant part the greater Ethiopian society, either because of the ‘domination’ 
thesis, or because of intrinsic cultural commonalities and interplay among the various 
ethnic groups and nationalities, or both, depending on one’s perspective.10  
 
Second, these dysfunctional behaviours are not all necessarily tied to hierarchical-
individualistic societal structure. Though this paper does not speak on all traditions—
there are over eighty ethnic groups or nationalities in Ethiopia—it is fair to say that these 
behaviours and norms do apply to some degree to other ethnicities with different 
structures. For example, the first behaviour, ‘personalization of issues’, mainly concerns 
the art of communication and may be common throughout Ethiopia. Consider the 
following scenario: a meeting of elders under a shady tree which, among various ethnic 
groups, is a classic setting in which conflict resolution is practiced. Consensus is a 
requirement and voting an alien concept. The issues on the agenda are often impossibly 
delicately broached, with everyone, as much as possible, choosing their words carefully. 
Disagreements are to be addressed indirectly and no one is to be directly contradicted. 
Antagonism, or even hints of antagonism, is to be avoided at all costs. All this because 
there is an underlying problem—a tendency for disagreements to become personal and 
                                                 
10
 According to the last (1994) population census in Ethiopia, out of the eighty or so ethnicities or 
nationalities in Ethiopia, the Amhara (30%) and Tigray (6%) together form a little more than a third of the 
population. The Oromo (32%) form the simple majority. 
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quickly escalate into unsolvable conflict! Add to this parochialism and the holding of 
grudges, and the ultra-sensitive approach becomes quite understandable. In this context, 
the idea of a vote, which in some cases may render the most efficient solution, would be 
unthinkable. 
 
So though inter-ethnic differences certainly exist, it is perhaps the similarities that are 
more relevant. Most importantly, in the context of this paper, the idea is that throughout 
Ethiopia, though perhaps in different shades and at different levels, some subset of the 
above dysfunctional behaviours exist and ought to be addressed. 
Social Capital 
The concept of social capital has gained marked popularity in social science literature 
over the past fifteen years or so. Partly because it is a newly popular term, and partly for 
other reasons discussed below, it has several definitions, many of which have several 
topologies and dimensions, and it used in different ways by various parties in various 
contexts. Indeed, there are probably as many papers about the definition of social capital, 
its scope, and even its usefulness as a concept, than there are on social capital research 
per se!11 So, a good place to start is with a brief primer on social capital, including the 
various interpretations of it. Then we will be in a position to put social capital in its place 
within the context of this paper; that is, to illustrate how it is how it is related to culture, 
specifically values, norms, and behaviour, and civil society, development, and 
democracy. 
 
We begin with Putnam et al, since their work, the most oft-cited piece in social capital 
literature, is often credited for starting the recent social capital trend. They define social 
capital as: 
 
“… (the) features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions.” (Putnam et al, 1993, p. 167) 
 
This definition was developed based on discoveries they made while studying the 
efficiency of regional governments in Italy. In the course of their research, they found 
“dramatic differences in institutional performance” between the regional governments in 
Northern Italy and those in Southern Italy, with those in the North functioning much 
better than those in the South. Putnam et al explain these differences by the gap in civic 
tradition between the two areas. In the North, there were more social networks, voluntary 
associations, greater participation in civic and political associations, less free-riding on 
public goods, etc. At the same time, Putnam et al found values and norms such as trust, 
reciprocity, honesty, reliability, and collaboration were much stronger in the North than 
the South. In other words, they found more social capital in Northern Italy than Southern 
Italy. They conclude then that the relatively low level of social capital in the South 
                                                 
11
 Much of this section is based on Woolcock (1998), Woolcock and Narayan (2000), Adam and Roncevic 
(2003), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004), and Dasgupta (2005), who give a good summary of the evolution of 
social capital over the past decade. 
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accounts for its inefficient regional governments, generally poor institutional 
performance, and democratic deficit. Their broader conclusion is that social capital has an 
important positive role in strengthening democracy. 
 
While Putnam et al’s definition of social capital gives a reasonable encapsulation of the 
concept, it also leaves plenty of room for interpretation. Trust, norms, and networks are 
complex ideas, and one can imagine many other features of social organization that 
facilitate coordinated actions. There are indeed “different types, levels, or dimensions of 
social capital, different performance outcomes associated with different combinations of 
these dimensions, and different sets of conditions that support or weaken favorable 
combinations” (Woolcock, 1998, p. 159). Below is a condensed explanation of the 
commonly discussed dimensions of social capital: 
 
1. Micro- and macro- 
An individual can have social capital—high levels of interpersonal or social trust, 
norms such as reciprocity, a wide network of friends, acquaintances, colleagues in 
various collectives, strong ties, etc. A group can have social capital, for example, 
a strong internal network of ties. And by the same token, whole societies and 
nations can have social capital; Northern Italy vs. Southern Italy in Putnam et al’s 
example. Micro-level social capital often applies to individuals or groups, 
whereas macro-level applies to social capital at the national or sub-national level. 
2. Bonding and bridging (also known as strong and weak ties).12 
Bonding refers to social capital within collectives, or inter-group social capital. 
For example, the strength of network ties within an ethnic entrepreneurship class, 
say Chinese-American small businesses. Bridging refers to social capital between 
collectives, or intra-group social capital, say between the Chinese-American small 
business community and mainstream businesses or markets. 
3. Externalities and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social capital 
A farmers’ labour support group (the Ethiopian wenfel, for example) increases the 
agricultural returns of its members and is likely a net benefit for its members. A 
criminal gang like the Mafia also gives some benefit to its members. However, 
the wenfel probably has positive externalities—effects on non-members or society 
at large—whereas the Mafia certainly has negative externalities. This is what is 
commonly meant by good and bad social capital. Note, however, that the wenfel 
or any other example of seemingly good social capital can also have negative 
externalities, if, for example, it has characteristics of being strongly exclusionary 
or parochial.13 
4. Civil society and social capital 
Civil society is the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests 
they hold in common—not for profit or exercise of political power.14 Social 
                                                 
12
 The terms ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ are used extensively in the literature; Woolcock and Narayan (1998, 
p. 320) give a good introductory summary. 
13
 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004, p. 15) give a general explanation and list some studies that illustrate 
potential negative externalities to strongly parochial manifestations of social capital. 
14
 This is what the World Bank considers its simplest definition, as found in Edwards (2000). 
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capital is a broader and more fine-grained concept. By definition, norms and 
networks are present in all realms where collectives of any nature, informal or 
formal, large or small, exist.  So, social capital, for instance, trust and friendship 
networks, can create or enhance civil society, for example, a grassroots 
neighbourhood association. At the same time, one would expect that the existence 
of vibrant civil society, all things being equal, to increase social capital by giving 
people practice at collective action. 
5. Cognitive (e.g. trust, norms, shared values) and structural (e.g. networks) 
Trust, norms, shared values, attitudes, beliefs, and the like are conceptually 
different from networks. The former, cognitive social capital, are derived from 
mental processes and reinforced by culture and ideology (Uphoff, 2000). The 
latter, structural social capital, describes the composition of social interactions 
themselves. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the two categories of 
social capital. Cognitive and structural social capital are interdependent—for 
example, trust increases an individual’s propensity to link with others or join a 
network, and the practice of being in a network or group helps individuals become 
more trusting.15 
Figure 1. Complementary categories of social capital 
 Structural Cognitive 
Sources and 
manifestations 
Roles and rules Norms 
Networks and other interpersonal 
relationships 
Values 
 Attitudes 
 Procedures and precedents Beliefs 
Domains  Social organization  Civic culture 
Dynamic factors  Horizontal linkages  Trust, solidarity, 
cooperation, generosity  Vertical linkages 
Common elements Expectations that lead to cooperative behavior, which 
produces mutual benefits 
Source: Uphoff (2000) 
 
This brief outline of the various dimensions of social capital shows that it can be 
considered to be, more than a concept, a praxis, “a code word used to federate disparate 
but interrelated research interests and to facilitate the cross-fertilization of ideas across 
disciplinary boundaries” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, p. 3). It is often said that the best 
feature of social capital is that it has enabled the various disciplines interested in 
development issues, primarily sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists on one 
                                                 
15
 There has been a long-standing concern about social capital’s heterogeneity. Many lament the confusion 
resulting from one term having so many meanings, as well as methodological problems such as difficulties 
in isolating and measuring cognitive social capital and ambiguous causality between the two categories. 
There are also concerns about the reliability of macro studies for various reasons, among which is the 
strength of the surveys they are based on. For these reasons, there is a trend to try and limit the definition of 
social capital to, for example, just micro networks. For more on this, see van Deth (2003), Dasgupta (2005) 
and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). 
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side, and economists on the other, some common language. The sociologists et al get to 
inject more ‘social’ into development discourse, while submitting more of their ideas to 
the type of quantitative rigour appreciated by economists. At the same time, economists 
gain more appreciation for the ‘social’ and get to be able to measure it via social capital.16 
 
In the same vein, the popularity of social capital has also helped boost the role of 
‘culture’ in development, culture defined simply as “… the common world of 
experiences, values, and knowledge that a certain social group constitutes and reproduces 
in their daily life” (Löfgren, 1981, p. 30, quoted in H. Vermeulen, 2001, p. 3). Cognitive 
social capital—norms, values, and attitudes such as trust, honesty, cooperation, and 
reciprocity—is part of culture. Those who believe that ‘culture matters’ to some extent or 
another to economic growth, development, and democracy now have a way of injecting 
their ideas in more quantitative terms into the development realm by using the concept of 
social capital. In other words, “Social capital… (becomes) a utilitarian way of looking at 
culture” (Fukuyama, 2002). 
 
And this is the role of social capital in this paper—to buttress the idea that norms, values, 
and attitudes affect development. In the theoretical realm, there is a good argument that 
social capital produces benefits for individuals, households, and societies, with ‘benefits’ 
meaning anything from greater household income to a higher Human Development Index 
to better governance (Fukuyama, 2002, presents a succinct explanation). In a society 
where norms of mutual trust and reciprocity are strong, voluntary groupings of people, 
from basic two-person associations to civil society organizations (CSO’s) tend to be 
easily formed, are effective, and enduring. These norms also strengthen social, economic, 
and political institutions, which are keys to development. Finally, they enable people to 
effectively articulate and assert their interests, which is the essence of democracy.
17
 
 
In the empirical realm, research on social capital, including cognitive social capital, is in 
its infancy and still in the process of achieving methodological soundness, but what there 
is of it does give significant support for the above conclusions. Some examples: Putnam 
et al (1993) (notwithstanding criticisms) conclude that greater social capital, including 
cognitive social capital such as trust, results in better governance and democracy. Knack 
and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) show that at a national level, trust has 
positive impact on economic growth. Paxton (2002) shows that social capital (with trust 
as one component of social capital) is a determinant of the level of democracy in nations. 
On the micro level, Krishna (2001) shows that participation, trust, solidarity, and 
reciprocity result in, among other things, less poverty and more employment prospects. 
Uphoff (2000) explains how an increase in cognitive social capital, brought about by an 
educational campaign, resulted in Pareto-optimal use of a shared irrigation system that 
had hitherto been inefficiently utilized. Mogues (2005) finds that bonding and bridging 
social capital among households in rural north-eastern Ethiopia has a positive effect on 
asset holdings and mitigates the impact of income shocks on livestock capital Again, it is 
                                                 
16
 Bebbington et al (2004) and Edwards (2000) provide a thorough analysis of the ‘social capital effect’ 
among development specialists in general and especially at the World Bank. 
17
 On the other hand, the absence of these norms results in social atomization, which permits 
authoritarianism, or generally, democratic deficit. 
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worth noting that empirical research on social capital is still at an early stage, though 
promising links have already been made between social capital and development and 
democracy. 
Discussion 
Recall that the dysfunctional behaviours attributed to Ethiopian society—personalization 
of issues, parochialism, mutual distrust, paranoia, lack of empathy, character 
assassination, lack of openness, holding grudges, envy, and stubbornness—have negative 
effects on communication, conflict, and conflict resolution. These behaviours are 
obviously antithetic to the norms that promote social cooperation, such as trust, 
reciprocity, collaboration, openness, and the like. A society in which these dysfunctional 
behaviours are the norm has, by definition, relatively little social capital. 
 
Given this, the next question is: Are these dysfunctional behaviours and their underlying 
cultural norms, values, and attitudes really significant characteristics of Ethiopian 
society? There is much in the anthropological and sociological literature on Ethiopian 
society that supports this thesis. Many of these dysfunctional behaviours were noted over 
forty years ago in Levine’s (1965) seminal work. He found that these behaviours were 
part of a society characterized by rugged individualism, suspicion, fatalism, ambiguity, 
etc., a society with norms not conducive to collective effort. Concerned about how such a 
society would respond to modernity, he wrote, “…modernization is unthinkable without a 
significant increase in solidaristic sentiments and rationalized organization” (Levine, 
1965, p. 283). Many of Levine’s conclusions regarding ‘hierarchical-individualistic 
structure’ and ‘weak horizontal ties’ (Levine, 2000 [1974]) being properties of Amhara 
society are echoed by other Ethiopianist researchers. Messay (1999, p. 250), adding to 
Levine’s above statement, writes, “In effect, the Ethiopians are ill equipped for 
organizing strikes with the view of defending or obtaining collective rights.”18 Crummey 
(1980, pp. 123-124) talks about hierarchical patron-client ties overriding any horizontal 
ties (among the peasantry). Habtamu (1994), in a psychological study of university 
students in Addis Ababa, finds mutual distrust one among several negative characteristics 
in Ethiopian society. Korten (1971) finds that Ethiopian folktales reflect a view of life as 
a zero-sum game and writes, “Perceived opportunities for initiative and cooperation in 
service to the community are limited.” 
 
There are criticisms of the above characterizations of Ethiopian society which, for the 
purposes of this paper, are grouped into two broad categories. The first is based on 
ideological/theoretical grounds—mainly that Levine’s approach in particular is outdated 
structural-functionalism and that talking about culture in this way smacks of cultural 
determinism or essentialism (Tesfaye, 2004, and Harrison, 2002, give brief criticisms).19 
                                                 
18
 Messay continues, “The movement quickly decomposes, mostly by the influence of vertical calculations 
on the part of leaders and influential participants. Above all, the Ethiopians do not feel ashamed or 
dishonored by the failure, as communal obligations have little value for them.” 
19
 Tesfaye does point out that there is still no ‘full-scale and systematic’ critique of Wax and Gold in the 
literature, though the book is over forty years old and has been a major influence on many works. Harrison 
expresses legitimate concern about what might be a perception of a homogenous ‘Abyssinian culture’; this 
is addressed in the ‘Dysfunctional Behaviours’ section above.  
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Most of these concerns revolve around the eternal culture vs. structure debate: the 
question of culture being a determinant, dependent, or in between. There seems to be a 
fear of ‘culturalism’—that to think about culture in development at all will lead to it 
being abused, conflated, treated as homogenous, unchanging, and all-determining. 
Indeed, the past decade or so has seen works such as Culture Matters (Harrison and 
Huntington, 2000) and The Central Liberal Truth (Harrison, 2006) that argue the thesis 
that culture may be the greatest determinant in a society’s development. The latter goes 
so far as to list universal cultural traits common to all underdeveloped societies (some, 
incidentally are similar to our dysfunctional behaviours). However, the existence of such 
perhaps excessive arguments should not deter us from giving culture its due in 
development discourse—it is here to stay.20 There is a reasonable position to take on the 
culture debate, which is that culture matters to some extent or another. As Sen (2004) 
writes, “The real issue…is how—not whether—culture matters.” 
 
The second criticism is on practical grounds—that Ethiopian society does not display the 
above characteristics, or at least not to any greater extent than other societies. Tesfaye 
(2004) holds up the wenfel as a robust example of solidaristic association among the 
Amhara peasantry in the area he studied. Tesfaye contends that the wenfel is more than 
just a farmers’ labour support group: it is a generalized form of institutional social 
reciprocity, similar in its pervasiveness to the Chinese guanxi. Wenfel permeates all 
aspects of peasant life, including agricultural and non-agricultural work, social events, 
and other contexts in which social relationships are manifested. Other well-known forms 
of traditional social capital in Ethiopia are rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs - equb), religious social support groups (mehaber), various farmers’ labour 
sharing arrangements (debait, jige, debo), and burial societies (iddir). 
 
But of course, the mere existence of these voluntary associations does not imply that the 
assertion that Ethiopian society is hierarchical-individualistic with weak horizontal ties is 
false. After all, Putnam et al’s Southern Italy does contain some voluntary associations. 
ROSCAs (e.g. djangi in Cameroon), labour-sharing arrangements (e.g. kombi in Sierra 
Leone), burial societies (e.g. diswaeti in Botswana), and similar associations exist in most 
parts of Africa and the developing world, and in many traditions. In 1950’s Japan, rural 
communities typically had an average of fifteen to twenty-five voluntary associations 
(Norbeck, 1972)! Social capital and voluntary associations exist to some extent 
everywhere—the question is about their relative quality and quantity. 
Conclusion 
The thesis of this paper is that there are certain cultural norms, ‘dysfunctional 
behaviours’, in Ethiopian society, both in the diaspora and in the homeland, that hamper 
effective communication, lead to intra-group conflict, and inhibit conflict resolution. 
These behaviours make cooperation difficult, and so, by definition, inhibit social capital 
and the growth of civil society, and by extension, democracy. 
 
                                                 
20
 Apthorpe (2005) and Vermeulen (2001), both hardly cultural determinists, provide good explanations as 
to why culture can no longer be ignored and about the real and imagined dangers of culturalism. 
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This being a discussion paper, the purpose behind its perhaps provocative thesis is to 
raise questions and encourage further research. I suggest the following lines of inquiry: 
 
1. Are these dysfunctional behaviours really characteristics of Ethiopian society? 
What is their impact? Forty years after Wax and Gold, there is certainly room for 
a re-evaluation, affirming or critical.  
2. What is the state of social capital in Ethiopia? How does it compare with 
elsewhere? New, robust tools, such as better surveys, are being developed that 
might make cross-country studies of social capital more reliable than they are 
now. 
3. What is the state of social capital among Ethiopian immigrants in developed 
countries? How do Ethiopian immigrants compare with other immigrant groups in 
their host countries, in terms of social capital and other variables? The diaspora is 
an excellent laboratory for research, both from the point of view of logistics, and 
because it so beautifully constrains many variables. It also has the potential to 
allow certain inferences to be made of the culture of immigrants in their native 
countries.
21
 
4. Assuming the dysfunctional behaviours thesis is true, can these behaviours be 
addressed and how? What sort of intervention strategies would be effective in 
bringing about change? Unlike advocacy for other types of cultural change, such 
as changing customs or practices, few would overtly resist the teaching of basic 
habits to help promote effective communication, conflict prevention, and 
improved conflict resolution practices. How can we use this to our advantage? 
How can social marketing be effectively used for these purposes? What is the role 
of development practitioners and native Ethiopian institutions such as religious 
organizations and governments? I think that the role of native Ethiopian 
institutions in this regard is absolutely crucial. As Levine (1965, p.51) writes, 
“The vitality of a people springs from feeling at home in its culture and from a 
sense of kinship with its past. The negation of all those sentiments acquired in 
childhood leaves man adrift, a prey to random images and destructive 
impulses…The most productive and liberating sort of social change is that built 
on continuity with the past.”  
                                                 
21
 H. Vermeulen (2001) and F. Vermeulen (2005) present thorough discussions of culture in the context of 
immigrant studies. 
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